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RUNAWAY GUARANTORS: 
REEVALUATING THE SCOPE OF 
THE SHAM GUARANTY DEFENSE 
Ndidi Onyebuchukwu* 
Guarantors are responsible to lenders for the debts that they guarantee. 
Unfortunately, some guarantors try to avoid this responsibility by 
asserting the sham guaranty defense, a defense with poorly defined 
criteria and an inconstant application. The current lack of clarity 
surrounding the sham guaranty defense has rendered it susceptible to 
abuse by runaway guarantors and left lenders uncertain about how to 
best structure their commercial real estate loan transactions. Against 
this backdrop, this Note surveys the current state of the sham guarantee 
defense in California, focusing both on the historical development of the 
defense and the common factual scenarios in which it is asserted. Next, 
this Note explores how the California courts’ uneven treatment of the 
defense has resulted in confusion, unfair results, and an expansion of 
the defense that favors guarantors. Finally, this Note argues that the 
California Legislature should intervene and provide guidance to the 
courts about the proper scope of the sham guaranty defense. To assist 
in this effort, this Note offers proposed statute that legislators and other 
interested parties may consider in their attempts to provide some much-
needed stability to this area of commercial lending law. 
  
 
 * J.D., May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S., May 2009, California State 
University, Dominguez Hills. Thanks to Professor Dan Schechter for his extraordinary patience 
and wealth of knowledge about California guarantor law, which he graciously and ever so 
patiently shared with me. Also, thanks to the 2011–2012 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Note 
and Comment Editors for their valuable advice. Finally, special thanks to my family for their 
support throughout this process. Their constant advice and understanding made it all worthwhile 
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“While you may not think it’s true . . . 
creditors are people too.”
1
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, lenders had little to worry about when they 
approved a loan that was partly based on the assurance of a 
guarantor. Guaranties used to be a routine part of these loan 
transactions. However, “[i]n the current economic climate, 
guarantors and lenders are taking a closer look at their guaranty 
agreements.”
2
 Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the area of 
commercial real estate loans secured by real property.
3
 
A surety or guarantor can be defined as one who “promises to 
answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or 
hypothecates property as security.”
4
 Conceptually, a guaranty is 
simply “a promise to pay the debt of another.”
5
 But courts have not 
historically favored guaranties, and guarantors have successfully 
asserted several defenses to avoid accountability for the loans they 
freely guaranteed.
6
 
Further, courts have historically shown a great deal of concern 
for guarantors, “exonerating them from their obligations 
whenever . . . [borrowers and lenders] change[d] the contract without 
the guarantor’s consent.”
7
 The courts’ concern likely stemmed from 
their effort to understand what, exactly, the guarantors agreed to 
 
 1. Debt Negotiation, NATIONWIDE DEBT SETTLEMENT GROUP, http://www.nationwidedebt 
settlementgroup.net/debt-negotiation.php (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 2. Stephen Peterson et al., Enforcing Commercial Real Estate Loan Guaranties, GA. B. J., 
Oct. 2009, at 12, 18. 
 3. See id.; see generally Carl D. Ciochon, Guarantor Liability—A Litigation Perspective, 
WENDEL ROSEN (Fall 2008), http://www.wendel.com/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
content.contentDetail&ID=9018 (summarizing a California law governing guaranties in real 
estate secured transactions); Charles S. Ferrel & Jeffery S. Thieve, Time to Think About Your 
Real Estate Loan Guaranty, FEAGRE BAKER DANIELS (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.faegrebd.com/ 
9026 (discussing guaranty laws in the commercial real estate context). 
 4. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2787–2788 (West 2008). However, the California legislature 
abolished the distinction between surety and guarantor in 1939. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2787. 
 5. John R. Ruhr, Enforcing Commercial Guaranties in and out of Bankruptcy Court, RYAN 
SWANSON LAW 1, 1 (Mar. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ryanswansonlaw.com/attorneys/ 
documents/Ruhl-EnforcingGuaranties.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Roy S. Geiger & Michael A. Allen, Fool with a Pen: The Use of Single Purpose Entities 
in Real Estate Loans Has Raised New Issues for Lenders and Guarantors Alike, L.A. LAW., 
Jan. 2006, at 35, available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol28No11/2215.pdf. 
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answer for when they signed guaranty agreements.
8
 Nonetheless, 
despite guaranties’ unpopularity with courts, they serve a useful 
purpose in commercial loan transactions. By allowing the 
guarantor’s financial strength to enhance the creditworthiness of the 
borrower, guaranties enable borrowers to gain access to credit that 
might otherwise remain out of reach.
9
 
Unfortunately, guaranty enforcement is not as easy as guaranty 
creation. In fact, enforcement has become more difficult in the 
current U.S. economic environment.
10
 It is more difficult still in 
California, where the real estate crisis, which began in 2007, remains 
severe.
11
 “[F]ew people foresaw the historically significant economic 
storms of the recent past or the negative effect they would have on 
the [borrower’s] financial strength.”
12
 Needless to say, much has 
changed over the past few years due to these negative effects.
13
 
Today, as the number of foreclosures continues to increase, property 
values have declined below the levels lenders anticipated when they 
initiated the loan transactions.
14
 
These changes in the real estate landscape have increased 
lenders’ desire to foreclose quickly, before property values 
depreciate further.
15
 However, in California, unlike other states, the 
choice of foreclosure substantially affects the rights of all parties 
involved in the transaction.
16
 A lender has two options for 
foreclosing on a property. The first option gives the lender the right 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Ruhr, supra note 5, at 1. 
 10. John W. Easterbrook, Enforcing Loan Guarantees in an Anemic Economy: Beware of 
the Sham, SILICON VALLEY L. GRP., http://www.svlg.com/downloadpage.php?fuseaction= 
content.contentDetail&id=8871&lid=0 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
 11. Although this problem is prevalent in all parts of the country, this Note focuses on the 
issue in California. 
 12. Easterbrook, supra note 10. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Eric J. Rans & David J. Williams, A Lender’s Guide for Avoiding Sham Guaranty 
Claims—The Devil Is in the Details, 128 BANKING L.J. 483, 486 (2011). 
 15. Id. 
 16. In many states, the law does not prohibit a lender from getting a deficiency judgment 
from a borrower following a nonjudicial foreclosure. See State Limits on Deficiency Judgments, 
FORECLOSUREFISH (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.foreclosurefish.com/blog/index.php?id=994. 
These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, and Maryland. All of these 
states allow some form of deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial foreclosure. Id. This is a sharp 
contrast to California, where, by conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure, the lender is prohibited 
from obtaining any deficiency amounts from the borrower. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d 
(West 2008). For a definition of a “deficiency judgment,” see infra note 20. 
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to proceed through a judicial foreclosure, which is “often a lengthy 
process carried out through the court after . . . [the creditor has] 
obtain[ed] a judgment against the debtor.”
17
 
The second option is for the lender to proceed through a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the collateral real property.
18
 This is 
usually a “shorter, less formal, generally less expensive and simpler 
process.”
19
 Regardless of the type of foreclosure the lender conducts, 
“what if, after foreclosing on the borrower’s real property, a 
deficiency [sum] is still left owed to the lender[?]”
20
 For example, if 
a lender loans $8 million to a borrower, but the sale of the property 
recoups only $5 million, the lender is left $3 million short.
21
 
The legal consequences of the above situation depend on the 
form of foreclosure that the lender decides to take. If a lender 
pursues judicial foreclosure, it will be able to recoup the $3 million 
owed after the sale from the borrower.
22
 But if it proceeds through a 
nonjudicial foreclosure, there are laws that restrict the lender’s 
actions against the borrower.
23
 Statutes—called “antideficiency 
statutes”—protect the borrower by preventing the lender from 
obtaining a judgment for any deficiency still owed after the 
nonjudicial foreclosure.
24
 Borrowers cannot waive these protections, 
which are inapplicable to guarantors.
25
 
A guarantor is not completely without rights. In California, a 
guarantor enjoys two rights against a primary borrower, one direct 
and the other derivative.
26
 First, guarantors have a direct right of 
reimbursement against the borrower for any amounts it paid to the 
lender on behalf of the borrower.
27
 Second, guarantors enjoy a 
 
 17. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. “A deficiency judgment is an unsecured money judgment against a borrower whose 
mortgage foreclosure sale did not produce sufficient funds to pay the underlying promissory note, 
or loan, in full.” Jason Poland, Deficiency Judgments—Do the Banks Really Sue Homeowners? 
COLUMBUS REAL EST. NEWS, http://columbusrealestatenews.featuredblog.com/deficiency-
judgments-do-the-banks-really-sue-homeowners/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
 21. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 580a, 580b, 
580d, 726 (West 2008). 
 24. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 485. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Geiger & Allen, supra note 7, at 36. 
 27. Id. 
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derivative right known as subrogation in which they stand in the 
position of the lender and assert the lender’s right against the 
borrower.
28
 Unlike the borrower’s unwaivable statutory protections, 
a guarantor’s rights may be voluntarily waived.
29
 
These factors—the rise in foreclosures, antideficiency 
protections for borrowers, declining property values, and guarantors’ 
waivable rights—have all increased lenders’ incentives to pursue 
guarantors after judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure sales, in order to 
recoup remaining amounts.
30
 Unfortunately for lenders, when they 
call guarantors to answer for loans that the guarantors freely 
guaranteed, the guarantors often artfully claim defenses to avoid 
accountability.
31
 The most prominent is the “sham guaranty” 
defense, which stems from the principle that a borrower cannot 
guarantee his or her own debt.
32
 
As an illustration of this concept, assume the following facts. 
Owen is a developer who seeks a loan from the Los Angeles 
People’s Bank to finance the development of an apartment complex 
in Los Angeles. The bank reviews Owen’s financial standing and is 
satisfied. However, the bank informs Owen that to qualify for the 
loan, he must create a new company that will be used as the primary 
borrower. In addition, Owen would also guarantee the obligation of 
the new company he created. At the bank’s urging, Owen creates the 
new company, which becomes the primary borrower, and guarantees 
the loan. Under these facts, many, if not all, courts will find Owen’s 
guaranty a sham guaranty, which renders it unenforceable. The legal 
basis behind this argument is that the guarantor is the de facto 
borrower and cannot guarantee his own debt.
 33
 If a court finds that a 
guaranty is a “sham,” the guarantor will be treated as the real 
borrower. Consequently, the guarantor will be protected by the anti-
deficiency statutes, and he or she will be unable to waive the 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 483. For a discussion of how guarantors waive their 
rights, see infra Part II.A. 
 30. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 486. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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protections.
34
 Thus, a guarantor who succeeds on a sham guaranty 
defense is exonerated from further liability to the lender. 
Even though the finding of a sham guaranty has far-reaching 
consequences for the lender, California has not defined what 
constitutes a sham guaranty through either statutory or case law.
35
 As 
a result, courts often consider a broad variety of factors, including 
but not limited to (1) whether the principal obligor, if it is a 
corporation, was created for the sole purpose of entering into the 
underlying loan; (2) whether the lender inquired about the 
borrower’s financial status or merely relied on the guarantor’s 
financial statements; and (3) whether the purpose of the loan 
agreements was to avoid the antideficiency statutes.
36
 While courts 
generally balance these factors, they have done so inconsistently.
37
 
Not surprisingly, such inconsistencies have resulted in conflicting 
holdings in factually similar cases, and confusion for lenders.
38
 
The lack of clarity and the inconsistency in this area of law have 
left lenders unsure of whether a guarantor may escape its obligation 
under a commercial real estate loan transaction by invoking the sham 
guaranty defense. Part II.A of this Note includes a brief overview of 
guarantors’ statutory rights in California. It also examines the history 
of enforceable waivers through which guarantors voluntarily waive 
their statutory rights, thus paving the way for lenders to recoup their 
losses following a nonjudicial foreclosure. Part II.B discusses the 
 
 34. Maxwell M. Freeman & Elizabeth Freeman Guryev, An Overview of Defenses Available 
to Guarantors of Real Property Secured Transactions Under California Law, 38 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 329, 344 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
 35. Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“California law does not define ‘sham’ guaranties.”). 
 36. Robert M. Heller, You’re Exonerated: Exploring the “Sham Guaranty” Defense to 
Eliminate Liability Under a Guaranty, BIG NEWS FOR SMALLER FIRMS, Apr./May 2010, at 16, 
17, available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=97418d7f-dd6c-4dd0-
83e6-b78357911101 (citing considerations explored in Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 282 Cal. 
Rptr. 354, 361 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
 37. See, e.g., Paradise, 959 F.2d at 1468 (finding no sham guaranty problem because the 
creditor did not request that Enterprises—the guarantor—should be removed as the primary 
borrower and instead guaranty the loan); Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 
2008) (finding that the guarantors failed in their attempt to invoke the sham guaranty defense 
because they created a limited liability company to separate themselves from the obligation of the 
primary borrower); River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 802 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding 
a sham guaranty because the creditor used a preexisting entity—which was created by the 
guarantor—as the primary borrower); Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 
(Ct. App. 1964). 
 38. See supra note 37. 
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history of the sham guaranty defense, which is a last refuge for a 
guarantor who has waived his or her rights, and it examines common 
scenarios where guarantors have successfully or unsuccessfully 
asserted the defense. 
Part III illustrates the inconsistent application of the sham 
guaranty defense, which has resulted in confusion, unfair results, and 
an expansion of the defense that favors guarantors. Complicating this 
landscape is the California appellate court’s recent decision in 
Talbott v. Hustwit.
39
 Part IV proposes a legislative solution to the 
problem. Given the uncertainty surrounding the factual predicate for 
this defense, the legislature should expressly define its scope by 
outlining factors for courts to consider, designating the appropriate 
weight to accord to each factor, and delineating certain parameters 
that the courts should adhere to in applying the defense. 
II.  STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  Historical Perspective on 
Guarantors’ Statutory Rights 
and Waivers in California 
In California commercial real estate transactions where real 
property is used as security for debt, the borrower executes a deed of 
trust in favor of the lender, and the lender receives a promissory note 
from the borrower as evidence of the debt owed.
40
 If the borrower 
defaults on the promissory note, the lender has the option to 
foreclose on the secured property to recoup its loss.
41
 These 
transactions usually involve a personal guaranty of the obligation. 
Although the basic purpose of the guaranty is clear, “there can 
be no absolute assurance that every guaranty will be fully 
enforceable in [all] situation[s].”
42
 Thus, to protect their rights, 
lenders try to understand the guarantor’s and borrower’s rights under 
the applicable laws.
43
 Specifically, in California guarantors have 
statutory rights that make it difficult to enforce a guaranty. Among 
other things, statutes provide that the obligation of a guarantor “must 
 
 39. 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 40. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Ruhr, supra note 5, at 8. 
 43. Id. 
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be neither larger in amount nor in other respects more burdensome 
than that of the principal”;
44
 that the guarantor is exonerated if the 
creditor alters the principal’s original obligation without the 
guarantor’s consent or if the creditor’s remedies or rights against the 
principal are impaired;
45
 and that the guarantor may require the 
creditor “to proceed against the principal, or to pursue any other 
remedy in the creditor’s power which the [guarantor] cannot 
pursue.”
46
 
While a guarantor may voluntarily waive all of the above 
rights,
47
 it was not always clear to lenders what language would 
render their waivers valid and effective. This problem was apparent 
in the landmark case of Union Bank v. Gradsky.
48
 In Gradsky, a bank 
approved a construction loan that was secured by the real property of 
the primary borrower.
49
 The contractor for the project, Max Gradsky, 
personally guaranteed the loan, which included a general waiver.
50
 
Subsequently, the primary borrower defaulted on the construction 
loan; the lender sold the real property through a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale and sought to collect the remaining loan balance 
from Gradsky.
51
 
The court decided that because the bank pursued a remedy that 
“destroy[ed] both the security and the possibility of [Gradsky’s] 
reimbursement from the principal debtor,” it could not pursue 
Gradsky for a deficiency following the nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
52
 
By conducting a nonjudicial sale of the property, the bank 
 
 44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 2008). 
 45. Id. § 2819. 
 46. Id. § 2845. California law provides guarantors with a number of additional statutory 
protections. See, e.g., id. § 2847 (stating that a guarantor who satisfies the principal obligation is 
entitled to reimbursement from the principal); id. § 2848 (“[A guarantor], upon satisfying the 
obligation of the principal, is entitled to enforce every remedy which the creditor then has against 
the principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has expended . . . .”); Union Bank v. Gradsky, 
71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968) (holding that if a lender nonjudicially forecloses upon real 
property securing the debt—and thereby loses the right to a deficiency judgment under the 
California antideficiency laws—the lender is estopped from proceeding against the guarantor 
because the lender has destroyed the guarantor’s rights of subrogation and reimbursement). 
 47. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 485. 
 48. 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968). 
 49. Id. at 65–66. 
 50. Id. at 66. 
 51. Id. Recall from Part I that a lender cannot collect any deficiency amount from the 
primary borrower after conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure, so the lender instead pursues the 
guarantor. 
 52. Id. at 69. 
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irreparably damaged Gradsky’s postsubrogation rights under 
Sections 2848 and 2849 of the California Civil Code.
53
 Furthermore, 
Section 580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure prohibits a 
creditor and his assigns from further debt collection after a 
nonjudicial sale.
54
 Although Section 580d only protects the primary 
borrower, through its operation, the bank’s nonjudicial sale of the 
real-property security “fully destroy[ed] the future rights of any 
creditor, including the subrogated Gradsky. In light of these 
considerations, the court ruled in Gradsky’s favor.”
55
 After Gradsky, 
lenders began to draft documents that not only contained general 
waivers but also specific waivers of subrogation rights.
56
 
Lenders soon began using Gradsky waivers in an attempt to 
ensure that nonjudicial sales would not impair their ability to collect 
any remaining debt from a guarantor.
57
 Subsequently, the court in 
Cathay Bank v. Lee
58
 placed strict requirements on the validity of 
Gradsky waivers.
59
 Cathay Bank was later superseded by Section 
2856 of the California Civil Code, which relaxed these requirements 
and permitted guarantors to waive their Gradsky defenses.
60
 Through 
the statute, the California legislature finally clarified the validity and 
effectiveness of waivers. Following the legislature’s intervention, it 
appeared that lenders could finally be assured that, if they conducted 
 
 53. See David E. Hackett, Note, Guaranteed Confusion: The Uncertain Validity of 
Suretyship Defense Waivers in California, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2008). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1104. 
 56. Id. These waivers are called “Gradsky Waivers” after this landmark case. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993). In Cathay Bank, a bank loaned money to a 
corporate debtor, securing the principal obligation with both real property and a personal 
guaranty—with Gradsky waivers—from one of the corporation’s directors. Id. at 420–21. The 
corporation defaulted on its obligation, and the lender conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure and 
obtained summary judgment against the guarantor for the balance of the loan. Id. at 420. The 
court exonerated the guarantor, stating that the waiver “does nothing to tell the guarantor that the 
very fact of the loss of those subrogation rights itself has legal significance—namely that it 
confers an immunity from a deficiency judgment.” Id. at 423. 
 59. WRI Opportunity Loans II LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 221 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(noting that the Cathay court “imposed stringent requirements on a guarantor's waiver of a 
defense arising from the principal's rights under the antideficiency statutes”).  
 60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856 (West 2008); see also Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 221 (“Civil 
Code section 2856 was the Legislature's response to Cathay Bank . . . .”). Under this section, 
guarantors are “expressly permitted to waive the Gradsky defense and all common law rights and 
defenses.” Hackett, supra note 53, at 1107. California lawmakers enacted this legislation in 
response to lenders’ concerns that “it would be impossible to draft reliable [guaranty] documents 
with no clear guidance on future judicial review and intervention.” Id. at 1106–07. 
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a nonjudicial foreclosure, they could still recoup any remaining 
amounts from guarantors who waived their rights.
61
 Unfortunately, 
the expansive but inconsistent use of the sham guaranty continues to 
confuse lenders when structuring a transaction. 
B.  Historical Perspective of 
the Sham Guaranty Defense 
A guarantor, it has been said, is a “fool with a pen.”
62
 As such, 
courts indulge guarantors by creating several equitable defenses.
63
 
Guarantors routinely and voluntarily waive these defenses.
64
 As a 
result, waivers clear the way for lenders to recoup their losses from 
guarantors regardless of the form of foreclosure that the lenders 
pursue.
65
 When the waivers are deemed to be valid and effective, 
guarantors next turn to another avenue to avoid their obligations: the 
sham guaranty defense.
 66
  
It is indeed a convenient avenue because this area of law is 
sorely lacking in legislative and judicial guidance.
67
 Each case that 
has found a sham guaranty has been fact-sensitive.
68
 With no clear 
law to guide them in adjudicating this issue, courts rely on weighing 
several factors including: (1) whether the lender was directing the 
structure of the transaction;
69
 (2) whether the lender engineered a 
change in the borrowing entity and then required the initially 
proposed borrower, usually the sole shareholder, to execute a 
 
 61. See Hackett, supra note 53, at 1106–08. 
 62. MARK A. SENN, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LEASES: PREPARATION, NEGOTIATION, 
AND FORMS 28-18 (3d ed. 2004). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Transactional lawyers who draft guaranties will usually include contractual Gradsky 
waivers in the agreements that guarantors eventually endorse. Julia M. Wei, Guaranty, 
Guarantee, Potato, Potahto . . ., DIRTBLAWG (Nov. 26, 2008), http://dirtblawg.com/2008/11/ 
guaranty-guarantee-potato-potahto.html. 
 65. With valid waivers in place, the effect is that creditors can pursue guarantors for any 
remaining amounts after the foreclosure sale of the security, even if they have destroyed the 
guarantors’ subrogation rights. See Hackett, supra note 53, at 1097. 
 66. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 485–86. 
 67. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463, 1467–68 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2008); Cadle Co. II v. Harvey, 100 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 2000); River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 
1995); Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991); Valinda Builders, Inc. 
v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964). 
 69. See Valinda Builders, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 738. 
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guaranty;
70
 (3) whether the guarantor is the alter ego of the 
borrower;
71
 (4) whether the lender reviewed the guarantor’s financial 
information in approving the loan rather than relying on the 
borrower’s;
72
 (5) whether the lender demanded that the guarantor add 
additional collateral to the transaction;
73
 and (6) whether the lender 
first sought to secure liens on the guarantor’s personal property.
74
 
These factual inquiries have grown rather broad, giving lenders little 
guidance when structuring loan transactions involving personal 
guaranties. 
Most of the earlier sham guaranty cases focused mainly on the 
fact that the guarantor was merely an alter ego of the primary 
borrower—that the primary borrower, if an entity, was a shell entity, 
created solely for the transaction.
75
 One such case was Valinda 
Builders, Inc. v. Bissner.
76
 There, two men agreed to purchase 
acreage that would then be subdivided into building lots.
77
 In the 
agreement, the purchasers guaranteed payment of the purchase price 
and other obligations related to the ultimate development.
78
 When 
escrow was ready to close, the purchasers had title vest in a newly 
organized corporation that executed the promissory note.
79
 
When the project failed, the lender sued the guarantors on their 
personal guaranty of the loan.
80
 The court found that the corporation 
was a shell corporation that was created at the request of the lender 
solely for conducting the transaction.
81
 The court reasoned that the 
 
 70. See Mark Mengelberg & Anthony Burney, Proceed with Caution: Enforcing a Defaulted 
Loan Within the Framework of California’s One Action Rule, REAL EST. FIN. REP., Spring 2008, 
at 1, 7–8, available at http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/510fdaf1-8048-421b-9f08-
089a643be9c4_documentupload.pdf. 
 71. See Riddle v. Lashing, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902, 903 (Ct. App. 1962); infra note 75 and 
accompanying text. 
 72. See Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 802–03. 
 73. Heller, supra note 36, at 17. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Cadle Co. II v. Harvey, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2000); Torrey Pines Bank 
v. Hoffman, 282 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360–61 (Ct. App. 1991); Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 
Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (Ct. App. 1964). 
 76. 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964). 
 77. Id. at 735–36. 
 78. Id. at 736–37. 
 79. Id. at 736. 
 80. Id. at 736–37. 
 81. Id. at 737 (“There was no evidence that [the company] was anything other than an 
instrumentality used by the individuals or that defendants were ever removed from their status 
and obligations of purchasers.”). 
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purported guarantors were already liable for the debt as primary 
obligors and that the lenders could not recoup any additional 
amounts from them.
82
 The court thus exonerated the guarantors. 
A subsequent case addressed a scenario in which the guarantor 
was purportedly the alter ego of the primary borrower. In Torrey 
Pines Bank v. Hoffman,
83
 the plaintiff made a construction loan to an 
inter vivos trust that the trustees (and settlors) personally guaranteed, 
and appropriate waivers were inserted in the guaranty agreement.
84
 
After the primary borrower (the inter vivos trust) defaulted, the 
lender conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure but recouped less than the 
debt.
85
 The lender subsequently sued the guarantors for the 
remaining amount.
86
 The court denied any recovery to the lender on 
the basis that the borrower and the guarantor were in fact the same.
87
 
A similar case was Cadle Co. II v. Harvey.
88
 The Harvey Family 
Trust purchased real property from a bank and gave it a note secured 
by a deed of trust on the property.
89
 Mr. Harvey, the settlor and 
trustee of the trust, signed a personal guaranty.
90
 The trust defaulted 
on the loan, and the bank conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure.
91
 
Since the bank recouped less than the amount borrowed, it sued the 
guarantor to collect the balance.
92
 Under these facts, the court found 
that the guaranty was a sham since Mr. Harvey, as trustee, was the 
primary obligor on the note.
93
 
Courts deal with a different and more complex scenario when an 
individual unilaterally creates an entity prior to a transaction, uses 
that entity as the primary borrower or guarantor of a loan, and 
subsequently guarantees the debt.
94
 Since the guarantor was not 
induced to create this new entity, the question then becomes whether 
 
 82. See id. at 739. 
 83. 282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 84. Id. at 356–57. 
 85. Id. at 358. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 359. 
 88. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 89. Id. at 153. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 153–54. 
 94. See Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1992); 
River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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it is proper to allow him or her to later assert a sham guaranty 
defense.
95
 
The holdings in cases involving this factual scenario have been 
inconsistent at best. An older case that addressed a similar fact 
pattern was Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enterprises, 
Inc.
96
 The McWilliamses were ranchers who owned and operated 
their business through Enterprises, a corporation that father and son 
had formed together prior to their attempts to secure a loan.
97
 The 
McWilliamses controlled Enterprises and were its only 
shareholders.
98
 In order to purchase another ranch, the McWilliamses 
approached a bank seeking the loan necessary to finance the 
purchase.
99
 
To secure the loan, the McWilliamses served as the primary 
borrowers and Enterprises purported to guarantee the debt on the 
note.
100
 Subsequently, the McWilliamses defaulted on the loan and 
the bank foreclosed on the security.
101
 The holder of the note then 
sued Enterprises to recoup the remaining amounts, since Enterprises 
had guaranteed the debt.
102
 Although Enterprises tried to assert the 
sham guaranty defense, the court found that it was a true guarantor, 
even though the McWilliamses were its sole shareholders.
103
 The 
court reasoned that Enterprises was a viable entity that was not 
created at the inducement of the lender.
104
 The court further rejected 
the guarantor’s suggestion that the court adopt a “transactional 
instrumentality” rule.
105
 
However, two years after Paradise Land & Cattle Co., a court 
addressed a similar fact pattern but came to a different conclusion.
106
 
 
 95. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 489–91. 
 96. 959 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 97. Id. at 1465. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1467 (stating that the entity used as the guarantor was not a “dummy” company, 
but rather had substantial assets, so the McWilliamses could not assert the sham guaranty 
defense). 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 1468. “According to this [‘transactional instrumentality’] rule, viable, non-
‘dummy’ corporations controlled by the purchaser-debtor and used by the latter as an 
‘instrumentality’ for the purposes of the transaction should be considered the purchaser-debtor for 
the purposes of section 580b.” Id. 
 106. Although Paradise Land & Cattle Co. was decided by a federal court while River Bank 
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In River Bank America v. Diller,
107
 Sanford Diller, a real estate 
developer, and his wife, Helen, were the trustees of a revocable 
family trust that owned all of the stock in Prometheus Development 
(“Prometheus”).
108
 Prometheus sought construction loans from River 
Bank to complete an apartment complex.
109
 
To protect its right to recover from a guarantor if the primary 
borrower were to default, River Bank required that the primary 
borrower could not be Prometheus since the Dillers—the prospective 
guarantors if Prometheus was the primary borrower—were its only 
shareholders and, as such, were not distinct from it.
110
 
Coincidentally, the Dillers already owned a separate entity called 
Prom XX, which they routinely used as a place marker in other 
transactions.
111
 Further, Prom XX was not without any capital or 
assets.
112
 The Dillers suggested using Prom XX as the primary 
obligor in the transaction, with the Dillers guaranteeing the loan 
personally.
113
 
Prom XX defaulted on the loan and River Bank conducted a 
nonjudicial foreclosure.
114
 Following the nonjudicial foreclosure, 
River Bank sued the Dillers on their personal guaranty to recoup the 
remaining amount.
115
 Based on these facts, the court held that “the 
Dillers ha[d] raised a triable issue of fact concerning their ‘sham 
guaranty’ defense.”
116
 The court made this decision although Prom 
 
America was decided by a California court, Paradise Land & Cattle Co. was a diversity case in 
which California law applied. 
 107. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 108. Id. at 792. Although the guarantors made several other allegations against River Bank, 
such as accusations of modification and duress, this Note focuses only on the sham guaranty 
defense. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 802. 
 111. Id. at 801. 
 112. See id. The court mentioned that Prom XX did not have “substantial” assets or capital. 
Id. This, however, does not foreclose the possibility that the entity held some assets and capital. 
Courts have never delineated the amount of capital or assets that a company must have in these 
situations. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 488. 
 113. River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802. 
 114. Id. at 793. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 803. In finding for the Dillers, the court essentially adopted the transactional 
instrumentality rule that the court in Paradise Land & Cattle Co. had rejected. See Paradise Land 
& Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir. 1992). The River Bank 
America court emphasized that the bank used Prom XX—a company previously created and used 
as a place marker in other transactions by the Dillers—as the primary borrower. River Bank Am., 
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803. 
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XX was already in existence at the time of the transaction, and the 
lenders had not induced the Dillers to create the entity.
117
 
Furthermore, in finding that there was a triable issue as to the 
sham guaranty, the court also considered the Dillers’ assertion that 
River Bank did not inquire into the financial standing of Prom XX, 
the primary borrower, during the loan application process.
118
 Rather, 
River Bank relied heavily upon the Dillers’ own financial 
statements.
119
 Thus, the court concluded that since River Bank 
looked at the financial standing of the guarantors rather than that of 
the primary borrower, the guaranty was possibly a sham.
120
 
Following the different outcomes in River Bank America and 
Paradise Land & Cattle Co., the governing law of this factual 
scenario became even more confusing for lenders. On the one hand, 
lenders could be wary of situations in which individuals create an 
entity prior to a transaction without the inducement of the lender, the 
entity is used as the primary borrower in the transaction, the 
individual subsequently signs a personal guaranty, or the entity is 
used as a guarantor for the individual debt.  
On the other hand, such facts were clearly present in Paradise 
Land & Cattle Co., yet the court upheld the guaranty as a true 
guaranty. Consequently, the present state of this area of law creates 
several questions. What does the law require to find a sham guaranty 
defense? How broad is the scope of this defense, and how can 
lenders anticipate the defense when structuring their transactions 
without clear law? Thus far, the answer to these questions remains 
inconclusive. 
III.  CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW 
An investigation of the legal standards, factors, and other 
variables that are considered in the analysis of a sham guaranty 
defense could confuse any lawyer not familiar with California real 
property law.
121
 The problems that have plagued this area of law, and 
continue to do so, “stem from the secondary results of what appears, 
 
 117. See River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Andrew A. Bassak, Comment, Secured Transaction Guarantors in California: Is It Time 
to Reevaluate the Validity and Timing of Waivers of Rights?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265, 265 
(1992). 
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at first blush, to be [the] application of sound legal principle[s].”
122
 
However, upon closer examination, the California courts’ application 
and interpretation of the many factors considered in finding a sham 
guaranty—both those that can be contemplated at the time of 
transaction and those that cannot—has resulted in “a spin-off of 
confusion and inequity” in this area of the law.”
123
 
Lenders are often left perplexed.
124
 How can they structure a 
transactions in ways that would not run afoul of the sham guaranty 
defense? Without any statutory or case law that clearly states the 
rule, courts deciding the issue have been free to consider any number 
of factors that they and guarantors’ attorneys choose. As such, it 
becomes more difficult for lenders to prepare for foreclosure 
proceedings against borrowers who default on loans.
125
 A recent 
case, Talbott v. Hustwit,
126
 has done little to clarify this unsettled 
area of law. 
A.  The Talbott v. Hustwit Decision: 
A Return to Paradise Land & Cattle Co. or 
a Temporary Departure from River Bank America? 
Confusion regarding the laws that govern real estate loans 
secured by real property is not entirely new.
127
 Analyzing whether 
the guaranty is a “true” one is particularly important prior to the 
lender taking any enforcement actions.
128
 However, due to the 
confusion in this area, lenders are unable to effectively perform this 
analysis before structuring transactions.
129
 Thus, the implications can 
be disastrous for a lender who seeks to enforce a guaranty that is 
later determined to be a sham. 
The decision in Talbott v. Hustwit has made this issue even more 
confusing for lenders. It is a case of a lawyer who outsmarted 
himself. Hustwit and his wife were the settlors of a revocable trust 
 
 122. Id. at 286. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 266. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 127. See Hackett, supra note 53 (discussing the confusion over the validity of waivers). 
 128. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Barton, 789 F. Supp. 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1992); 
River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995); Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 
282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991); Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68 (Ct. App. 1968).  
 129. Bassak, supra note 121, at 265. 
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that owned real property.
130
 The trust borrowed money and the 
Hustwits personally guaranteed the debt.
131
 Unlike the guarantors in 
Cadle Co. II v. Harvey
132
 and Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman,
133
 who 
were also the trustees of the borrower trust, the Hustwits unilaterally 
formed a limited liability company to act as the trustee.
134
 
The trust defaulted on the loan, and the bank foreclosed via a 
nonjudicial foreclosure.
135
 Not surprisingly, the bank sued the 
Hustwits to collect the loan balance, and the Hustwits asserted the 
sham guaranty defense to avoid any obligation.
136
 The court held that 
the Hustwits, by creating a separate entity that stood as the primary 
borrower in their stead, became secondary obligors—i.e., 
guarantors.
137
 
Thus, the appellate court held that the Hustwits were indeed real 
guarantors.
138
 They were not trustees of the trust; instead, they had 
unilaterally created a limited liability company as trustee, thereby 
limiting their personal liability for the trust’s obligations.
139
 In fact, 
“the Hustwits simply outwitted themselves.”
140
 By going through the 
charade of creating an entity to stand in as the primary borrower, 
they effectively separated themselves from the trust, and made 
themselves true guarantors.
141
 
The similarities between Paradise Land & Cattle Co., River 
Bank America, and Talbott are clear. In all three cases, the following 
facts were present: (1) the individual borrower formed a separate 
entity prior to the creation of the underlying loan transaction; (2) the 
owner unilaterally created an entity without the lender’s inducement; 
(3) the individual borrower used the entity as the primary borrower 
 
 130. Talbott, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704, 707. 
 131. Id. at 704–05. 
 132. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 134. Talbott, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706–07. 
 135. Id. at 705. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 707. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 710 (Sills, J., concurring) (“[The Hustwits] cannot avail themselves of the 
protections of limited liability corporations and at the same time claim an obligation is really 
theirs.”). 
 141. See Dan Schechter, “Fair Value” Rule Does Not Apply to Guarantors, and Settlor of 
Family Trust Can Serve as “True Guarantor” if Settlor Is Separate from Trust [Talbot v. Hustwit 
(Cal. App.)], COM. FIN. NEWS., June 30, 2008, at 56 (“[T]he settlor of a family trust can serve as 
a ‘true guarantor’ of the trust’s debt, if the settlor is properly separated from the trust itself.”). 
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or guarantor in the transaction; and (4) the creator of the entity or the 
entity itself later guaranteed the debt. Given these basic similarities, 
it is a wonder that when faced with similar facts, courts have 
managed to rule differently on the sham guaranty issue. The likely 
reason for this disparity is a simple lack of clear law for the courts to 
follow when confronted with this defense.  
B.  The Implications of 
the Talbott v. Hustwit Ruling 
On its face, the Talbott ruling is welcome relief to lenders in 
California. After all, the decision can be construed to stand for the 
proposition that a borrower who creates a separate entity prior to 
entering a transaction should not be allowed to claim later that he and 
the entity are one and the same.
142
 However, the implication of the 
Talbott decision is not that rosy for lenders. A lender who accepts 
“the clumsy structure in Talbott, in which the settlor interpose[d] an 
intermediary special-purpose entity . . . as trustee, in order to create 
the appearance of separation between the trust (the primary debtor) 
and the settlor (as guarantor),” could still be exposed to a sham 
guaranty defense.
143
 
If the guarantor can demonstrate that the lender controlled the 
structure of the transaction or that the lender looked to the 
guarantor’s financial standing, as in River Bank America, a court 
might still stretch to find a sham guaranty—notwithstanding the 
apparent separation between the guarantor and the primary 
borrower.
144
 Furthermore, the decision in Talbott does not constrain 
the courts. Just as the court in River Bank America virtually ignored 
the factual similarities with Paradise Land & Cattle Co., a different 
case that happens to be factually similar to Talbott might still be 
decided in a different way. 
Of course, not all cases involving a sham guaranty defense are 
indefensible or confusing for lenders. Cases involving a lender who, 
in an effort to avoid the reach of debtor protections, forces an 
individual borrower to form a corporation to serve as the primary 
 
 142. See Talbott, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706–07 (finding that the Hustwits’ creation of a trust 
removed them from their status as debtors and made them true guarantors). 
 143. Schechter, supra note 141. 
 144. Id. 
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borrower for the loan transaction are clear enough.
145
 Unfortunately, 
the basic transaction structures of these cases are indistinguishable 
from the conventional loans in other cases in which the facts are 
distinct.
146
 Thus, following Paradise Land & Cattle Co., River Bank 
America, and Talbott, “it is not entirely clear whether a guaranty by 
an entity that wholly owns a borrowing subsidiary, even where they 
have both been organized many years earlier for different purposes, 
is fully enforceable following a nonjudicial foreclosure.”
147
 
C.  Courts’ Favoritism Towards Guarantors 
Has Led to the Inconsistent Application 
of the Sham Guaranty Defense 
The guarantor has always been a favorite of the law.
148
 “Perhaps 
as a result of a judicial preference for debtors or lawmakers’ fear of 
creditor overreaching, or a combination of the two, the enactment of 
statutory law . . . ha[s] betrayed a discernible deference to any party 
that becomes obligated to answer for the debt of another.”
149
 This is 
so despite the party’s initial willingness to be a secondary obligor. 
Not surprisingly, the guarantors’ initial willingness tends to dissipate 
when they are actually confronted with the liability they agreed to, 
and they begin to assert several grand defenses—like the sham 
guaranty defense. 
Cases that found a sham guaranty where the lender inspected the 
financial standing of the guarantor, or where the borrower initially 
created an entity prior to the transaction,
150
 may be explained only by 
concluding that “when confronted with a guarantor who elicits 
 
 145. This scenario occurs in situations where the guarantor is merely an “alter ego” of the 
borrower, and therefore is entitled to the protections of the “one action rule” and the 
“antideficiency rule.” David R. Krause-Leemon, Guarantors Beware, MCKENNA LONG & 
ALDRIDGE LLP (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.mckennalong.com/publications-advisories-
2868.html. “For example, if a lender requires a general partner to guaranty the loan of a limited 
partnership, [the] guaranty could be construed as an invalid sham guaranty since, by law, the 
general partner [is] already obligated for the debts of the partnership/borrower, and [is entitled to] 
receive[] the protections of a borrower.” Id. 
 146. LEGAL OPINION LETTERS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE 
§ 5.25, at 5–72 (M. John Sterna, Jr. ed., 3d ed. Supp. 2011). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Brian Specter, Is that Personal Guaranty Enforceable?, JENNINGS STRAUSS (Feb. 24, 
2012), http://jsslaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/is-that-personal-guaranty-enforceable.html. 
 149. Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial 
Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 655, 660 (1983). 
 150. See River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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sympathy, the courts are willing to find numerous reasons to 
abrogate the guaranty contract.”
151
 Unfortunately, “[t]his sentimental 
deference to the plight of the guarantor has seldom been the source 
of venerable legal principles.”
152
 As the cases have shown, the courts 
are not always careful in applying these factors consistently. 
Consequently, “the creditors’ only practical response 
“necessarily resembles something of a shotgun approach.”
153
 As 
lenders attempt to draft guaranty forms that can avoid various 
defenses by guarantors,
154
 knowledge and understanding of 
applicable laws are necessary to create an effective guaranty 
agreement. Such knowledge and understanding is presently 
nonexistent with regards to the scope of the sham guaranty defense. 
Confronted with a substantial bias favoring guarantors, the “perhaps 
unfortunate” creditor who relies in good faith on a loan guaranty 
frequently becomes the victim of proguarantor decisions.”
155
 
Although sound reasons exist for many of the guarantor’s defenses, 
“the courts’ inconsistencies have hampered the integrity of credit 
documentation” and weakened lenders’ ability to effectively look out 
for their interests
156
—recouping remaining amounts after a 
foreclosure sale recovers less than the amount loaned. 
Thus, based on current law, the cases suggest that a lender’s 
arguments to avoid a sham guaranty defense by a guarantor, “no 
matter how reasonable, might not prevail when directed at a 
guarantor favored by the court.”
157
  
D.  Lenders’ Inquiries into the Guarantor’s 
Financial Status Should Not Expose Them 
to a Sham Guaranty Defense 
“One central and often ignored principle concerning guaranties 
has remained true from the time of Solomon through the era of 
structured finance—a guaranty is only as good as the guarantor.”
158
 
In other words, a guaranty is of little use if the guarantor is not 
 
 151. Alces, supra note 149, at 660. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 661. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 683. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 665. 
 158. Peterson et al., supra note 2, at 12, 18. 
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financially capable of assuming the debt of the primary obligor if 
they default. While some unsophisticated guarantors may garner 
sympathy from the courts,
159
 guarantors involved in large 
commercial real estate transactions are presumed to be more 
sophisticated.
160
 They ought to understand that they are legally 
bound to pay back the loan if the borrower cannot or will not pay. 
“The general rule of law is that a guaranty is a separate 
independent contract, and the guarantor has secondary liability after 
the default of the debtor is proven.”
161
 Because the guaranty is a 
separate contract, a lender will have to look into the financial 
strength of the guarantor. The lender does this not only to ensure that 
the guarantor will be able to step in and pay the debt if the primary 
borrower is unable to but also to ensure that the guarantor can 
enhance the credit of the primary borrower.
162
 But with the court’s 
decision in River Bank America based in part on the fact that the 
bank looked primarily at the financial standing of the guarantors, 
lenders are in a difficult situation. 
The reality in current real estate lending is that lenders “look 
principally to the financial condition of the guarantors and other 
principals of the borrower, rather than the [financial condition of the] 
borrower . . . .”
163
 Lenders may also dictate the entity structure of the 
borrower; for example, when a transaction involves nonsecuritized 
loans, lenders often insist on a guaranty.
164
 
In light of these considerations, it is not strange that some 
commercial loan approval decisions are based on the financial 
strength of the guarantor.
165
 Typically, the lending institution 
 
 159. Han Nguyen, Gauging the Personal Guaranty for Your Borrower’s Loan, LAW360 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.schnader.com/files/Publication/f1e6bb31-3e3e-400f-acd2-
b9d8a82fc961/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dbde5595-8359-4523-8f44-
c038883488be/Nguyen_Han_Guaranty_Nov%202011.pdf. 
 160. Douglas C. Flowers, Guarantor Waivers of the Fair Market Value Hearing, STATE BAR 
OF NEV., https://www.nvbar.org/sites/default/files/Guarantor%20Waivers%20of%20the% 
20Fair%20Market%20Value%20Hearing.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). 
 161. GREGORY G. GARFIELD, THE STRUCTURE AND USE OF REAL ESTATE GUARANTIES AND 
SURETIES 2 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://klehr.com/C7756B/assets/files/lawarticles/ 
Guaranty%20Manual%20III.pdf. 
 162. See Geiger & Allen, supra note 7, at 35. 
 163. Peter J. Gregora, Guarantees, Letters of Credit and Comfort Letters in Mortgage 
Financing, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BORROWERS AND LENDERS NEED 
TO KNOW NOW 2002, at 416 (PLI Real Estate Practice, Course Handbook Ser. Nos. 478, 2002). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Tom Atkinson, Guarantor Analysis—Contingency Cash Flow, TIB TICKER (Sept. 7, 
2011), http://www.mybankersbank.com/tib-ticker/archive/date/2011-09-07. 
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requires information sufficient to assess the guarantor’s financial 
ability to satisfy the obligation. 
166
 It is therefore difficult to defend 
the proposition that a lender who looks too closely at the financial 
strength of the guarantor in our current economy should fall prey to 
the sham guaranty defense. Unfortunately, the present state of this 
area of law allows and even encourages this position. 
E.  The Expansive Use of 
the Sham Guaranty Defense 
Discourages Individual Responsibility 
A lender usually requires a guaranty prior to approving a loan 
because it is unsure whether a borrower is capable of paying it 
back.
167
 Under such circumstances, “the lender will not advance the 
loan without the comfort of a guarantor.”
168
 With that being said, 
most lenders advise the prospective guarantor to seek independent 
legal advice regarding the transaction.
169
 A guarantor’s legal adviser, 
assuming they are proficient in this area of law, could lay out the 
different options available to the guarantor in order for them to make 
an informed decision regarding the type of guaranty agreement they 
are willing to sign. 
There are basically three different types of guaranties available, 
and they each expose the guarantor to varying degrees of liability in 
the event the primary borrower defaults. The first type is called a 
payment guaranty.
170
 Under a payment guaranty, “[t]he guarantor 
typically waives notice, . . . demand for payment and any 
requirement that the lender proceed against the principal obligor or 
the collateral before making a claim against the guarantor.”
171
 
 
 166. Id. Some of the factors include “liquidity, income, debt and debt service requirements, 
other cash uses, contingent liabilities, and other relevant factors including credit ratings.” Id. 
 167. Neil Molyneux, Signing a Guarantee Agreement? Think Twice, INT’L. L. OFF. (May 28, 
2010), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/detail.aspx?g=5ea84a64-1cd8-4e1a-
afc9-308c0cdb18fc. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Personal Guarantees and the Potential Consequences of Giving Them, QFINANCE, 
http://www.qfinance.com/business-strategy-checklists/personal-guarantees-and-the-potential-
consequences-of-giving-them (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
 170. Susan C. Tarnower, Trends in Commercial Real Estate Loan Guarantees, WEALTH 
STRATEGIES J. (June 6, 2011), http://www.wealthstrategiesjournal.com/articles/2011/06/trends-
in-commercial-real-esta.html. 
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A second common guaranty is a limited guaranty,
172
 which may 
be limited in several ways.
173
 One common way is to limit the 
amount for which the guarantor is liable.
174
 The guarantor will then 
only take on the responsibility that he or she bargained for should the 
need arise.
175
 Finally, a third guaranty available is a nonrecourse 
guaranty.
176
 This type of guaranty limits the liability for default to 
recovery against the property, subject to a few exceptions.
177
 
After the proper disclosures are made to the guarantors, it would 
be safe to assume that they have a good sense of their obligations 
under each type of guaranty. It follows, then, that for them to later 
assert that they were victimized, or were unaware of the full extent of 
their obligations, or were deceived, would be a mockery to individual 
responsibility. Nonetheless, with the current state of the law, even a 
fully informed guarantor can still assert the defense in an attempt to 
avoid his or her obligation.
178
 
Such unrestrained use of an equitable defense by savvy 
guarantors must be restricted. If guarantors are free to use the sham 
guaranty defense even when they are sophisticated, lenders’ abilities 
to rely on guaranties will consequently be derailed. Moreover, 
guarantors’ attorneys will continue to come up with more novel 
factors for the courts to consider. Without any guidance or 
restrictions, courts will be hard pressed not to follow their lead, 
which will result in even more confusion in this area of law. Lest this 
be characterized as the “parade of the horribles,” a brief look at the 
history of this equitable defense shows a gradual expansion that has 
led to this present chaotic state. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
In the current economic climate, fulfilling loan obligations and 
generating new loans are of significant importance to lenders, 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. “The guarantor will typically sign a non-recourse guarantee outlining the 
circumstances under which this non-recourse loan becomes a limited or full recourse loan. The 
list of triggers for guarantor’s liability [are] sometimes called ‘bad boy carve-outs.’” Id. 
 178. See River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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borrowers, and guarantors alike.
179
 With borrowers defaulting on 
loans, guarantors invoking the sham guaranty defense to avoid 
liability, and lenders scrambling to mitigate their losses, some clarity 
is necessary. Thus, it is an appropriate time for the California 
Legislature to step in and clarify the scope of the sham guaranty 
defense like they did with the enforceability and validity of guaranty 
waivers.
180
 
In considering the most effective way to clarify this area of the 
law, it is imperative to accept that questions of whether a guaranty is 
a true guaranty or a sham will inevitably involve a factual analysis. 
Nonetheless, a factual analysis does not necessarily have to be 
unrestrained. Therefore, the legislature should give the courts some 
guidance and restrictions when considering the issue. Such guidance 
will aim to provide the courts with a list of factors to consider as well 
as indicate the importance of each. Finally, the legislature should set 
down certain parameters as a guide for courts to adhere to when 
applying these factors. 
With that in mind, the legislature or other interested parties can 
consider this proposal as a sample for future legislation on the sham 
guaranty defense: 
 
SECTION 2011(A): PRESUMPTION OF A SHAM GUARANTY 
Absent a substantial showing of some or all of the following 
factors, there is a strong presumption in favor of a true 
guaranty: 
1. Evidence that a lender induced a prospective borrower to 
create a new entity as a prerequisite to approving a loan, and 
the entity is later used as the primary borrower in place of the 
original borrower who subsequently becomes the guarantor. 
a) This section applies to lenders who maintain an 
established policy that requires the creation of a “special 
purpose entity” as a prerequisite to approving a loan, 
regardless of whether the prospective borrower already 
had such entity established. A “special purpose entity” is 
one that is created solely for the purpose of the underlying 
transaction, 
 
 179. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 483. 
 180. See Hackett, supra note 53, at 1117–20; discussion supra Part II.A. 
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b) This section applies to a lender’s continuous and 
persistent suggestions directed towards a prospective 
borrower to compel them to create a special purpose 
entity, 
c) This section does not apply to a transaction where: (1) 
the primary obligor, if a form of business entity, was in 
existence prior to the transaction; (2) the lender was not 
instrumental in its creation; and (3) the lender does not 
violate Section 2011(A)(1). 
2. Evidence that the primary obligor, if a corporation, is 
without any assets, thus making it a shell corporation. 
Nonetheless, a corporation’s lack of substantial assets, without 
additional evidence that it is a shell corporation, does not 
automatically render it a shell corporation. 
3. Evidence that a lender was aware of a guarantor’s naivety 
regarding the implications of the guaranty, and that the lender 
failed to advise the guarantor to seek independent legal 
representation to conduct the transaction on their behalf. 
a) A guarantor who signs a guaranty agreement is 
presumed to have had knowledge and a full understanding 
of the terms and consequences of the guaranty. 
b) A guarantor who has previously guaranteed a loan in a 
similar transaction is deemed to be knowledgeable as to 
such matter and is thus estopped from invoking this 
subsection. 
c) The expressed opinion of the guarantor’s counsel 
regarding the validity of the transaction will be considered 
in evaluating the validity of said transaction. 
4. Evidence of fraud on the part of the lender. 
 
SECTION 2011(B): ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY FACTORS 
If a guarantor fails to overcome the presumption in favor of 
a true guaranty, a court may consider the following 
additional factors: 
1. Whether the lender directed the structure of the transaction 
and the guarantor did not have independent representation. 
2. Whether the guarantor is the alter ego of the borrower. 
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3. Whether the lender demanded that additional collateral 
owned by the guarantors be added to the transaction. 
4. Whether the lender first sought to secure liens on the 
guarantor’s personal property after the primary obligor 
defaulted. 
5. Whether the documents were ambiguous. For example, 
because of carelessness, does one document indicate a person 
is a borrower and another document state the person is a 
guarantor? When ambiguity in the documents exists, the lender 
can provide additional evidence to explain the discrepancy. 
6. Whether and to what degree a guarantor is sophisticated at 
the time they sign the agreement. 
7. Whether the guarantor independently formed the corporation 
for the purpose of procuring the loan from the lender. If so, the 
guarantor is estopped from invoking this subsection. Evidence 
of said purpose includes, but is not limited to: 
a) Failure of the incorporator(s) to observe corporate 
formalities in terms of behavior and documentation. 
b) Intermingling of assets of the corporation and of the 
shareholder. 
c) Treatment by the incorporator(s) of the assets of 
corporation as personal property. 
8. Other factors that are specifically tailored to a case. 
 
SECTION 2011(C): BALANCING CONSTRAINTS 
Without limiting the force of sections 2011(A) and (B), the 
courts, in applying these factors, shall abide by the 
following constraints: 
1. The factors in sections 2011 (A) and (B) will not, on their 
own, be determinative of a sham guaranty. 
2. Where the challenger of a guaranty agreement fails to 
sufficiently overcome the presumption in section 2011(A), a 
higher showing of factors present in section 2011(B) will be 
required to overcome the presumption of a true guaranty. 
3. If a guarantor fails to carry his or her burden under this rule, 
but if the court determines that to find a true guaranty would be 
an injustice under the totality of the circumstances, the court, in 
its discretion, may invalidate the guaranty agreement in the 
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interest of justice. Such balancing must be tailored specifically 
to the case. A showing of injustice will not be found in the 
following situations: 
a) A guarantor who is already liable for other defaulted 
loans; 
b) A guarantor who had the opportunity to mitigate his 
liability from the outset of the transaction; 
c) A deep sense of sympathy for the plight of the 
guarantor as a secondary obligor; or 
d) A general feeling that lenders need to be punished 
based on a prevailing public animosity towards them. 
V.  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSAL 
This proposed legislation will serve as soothing relief in a 
chaotic area of law and is justified on a number of grounds. First, this 
proposal provides the courts with clear law to apply whenever they 
are confronted with a sham guaranty defense. Instead of considering 
a variety of novel factors that guarantors and their attorneys create, 
courts need only look to the law to know which factors to consider 
and how to balance them in order to reach a decision that is fair to all 
parties under the factual situation. 
Moreover, this proposal fosters a culture of responsibility by 
encouraging guarantors to be more cautious before signing 
guaranties. Instead of relying on a court’s sympathy to avoid liability 
on loans they voluntarily guaranteed, guarantors will be more likely 
to look for ways to reduce their liability in anticipation of the 
primary obligor defaulting. Even borrowers, who might ordinarily 
contemplate creating a fictitious entity to get approval for a loan that 
they later guaranty, will reevaluate the wisdom of their strategy in 
light of this legislation. 
Furthermore, this legislation will finally alleviate lenders’ 
confusion in this area of law. When structuring their transactions, the 
proposal alerts lenders to a set of factors that might expose them to a 
sham guaranty defense. This places them in a better position to avoid 
falling prey to a guarantor’s sham guaranty defense, since they can 
better anticipate problematic behaviors and strategies. 
Additionally, the proposal addresses the potential that if given 
the chance, lenders may seek to take advantage of both the borrower 
and the guarantor. To mitigate this concern, the proposed legislation 
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includes provisions that give courts some controlled discretion in 
situations in which a creditor has clearly gone against the rule but the 
guarantor is unable to prove the specific factors to establish a sham 
guaranty defense. Thus, the proposal is fair to all parties involved. 
Finally, this proposed legislative solution is consistent with the 
policy reasons behind the California antideficiency statutes that were 
designed to limit the liability of real property owners following 
foreclosure.
181
 The proposal does not remove any protection from a 
real property owner, but works to hold guarantors accountable. 
The proposed legislation will be a conversation starter for the 
California Legislature in its attempts to clarify this area of law. As 
the economic situation continues to unfold, the effects on the 
commercial real estate market may require the legislature to continue 
to amend certain sections of any statute they eventually choose to 
adopt. Nonetheless, this proposed solution serves as a step in the 
right direction in the quest for clarity of the sham guaranty defense. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Creditors serve a crucial role in our economy. “Every nation 
needs a mechanism to expand its money supply, consistent with the 
growth rate potential of the economy.”
182
 Creditors serve that 
function by making loans available for economic development. They 
provide much needed funds to the small business owner who seeks to 
expand, the real estate developer who seeks to develop a new mall, 
the multinational corporation that seeks to conduct a merger, and 
many other entities. Guaranty contracts are a fundamentally 
important tool to all parties in such transactions. 
Such an important part of the economy should have clear laws 
governing its adjudication. The law should work for all parties, 
instead of treating some as villains and others as favorites. Moreover, 
this is hardly the first time the courts have faced challenges in 
enforcing guaranties without any law to guide them. They faced the 
challenge of guaranty enforceability in the mid-1990s, and the 
legislature sensibly worked to safeguard their viability by enacting a 
 
 181. The Real Estate Market, California’s Anti-Deficiency Laws and Sham Guaranty, 
ROBERT M. HELLER, http://www.rhellerlaw.com/anti-deficiency-laws-sham-guaranty.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 182. In Defense of Private Banking, WFHUMMEL, http://wfhummel.cnchost.com/ 
privatebanking.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
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law that specifically clarified the issue.
183
 The same should be done 
here. In the current economic climate, the sham guaranty defense 
issue is important, and failure to act will preserve a status quo that is 
inherently unfair and seeks to punish an important sector of the 
economy. 
 
 
 183. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing how the California Legislature finally 
clarified the enforceability and validity of guaranty waivers). 
